








We	 discuss	 here	 what	 we	 feel	 could	 be	 an	 improvement	 in	 future	
discussions	 of	 the	 brain	 acting	 as	 a	 Bayesian-Laplacian	 system,	 by	
distinguishing	 between	 two	 classes	 of	 priors	 on	 which	 the	 brain’s	
inferential	systems	operate.	In	one	category	are	biological	priors	(β	priors)	
and	 in	 the	 other	 artefactual	 ones	 (α	 priors).	 We	 argue	 that	 β	 priors	 are	
inherited	or	acquired	very	rapidly	after	birth	and	are	much	more	resistant	
to	varying	experiences	than	α	priors	which,	being	continuously	acquired	at	
various	 stages	 throughout	post-natal	 life,	 are	much	more	accommodating	
of,	 and	 hospitable	 to,	 new	 experiences.	 Consequently,	 the	 posteriors	
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(Bovens	&	Hartmann,	2005)	(Talbott,	2008)(Rosenkrantz,	1977)	(Gelman	&	Shalizi,	2013)	and	probabilistic,	statistical,	and	computational	implications	(Good	et	al.,	1966)	(Bernardo	&	Smith,	2008)	(Gelman	et	al.,	2004).	It	summarizes	a	fundamental	inferential	principle	in	which	probabilities	of	occurrence	of	events	are	based	on	priors	and	lead	to	posteriors,	which	in	turn	modify	inference	(Kersten	et	al.,	2004,	Knill	and	Pouget,	2004,	Yuille	and	Kersten,	2006,	Clark,	2013)	and	behaviour	(Friston	et	al.,	2011,	Botvinick	and	Toussaint,	2012,	Friston	et	al.,	2015).			It	is	an	approach	wherein	inferential	statements,	e.g.	that	the	currency	of	an	unstable	country	will	change	in	value,	can	be	formulated	by	a	simple	probability	law	based	upon	the	current	state	of	that	country	and	historical	examples	of	currency	fluctuations	with	unstable	governments.			Fundamental	to	this	operation	is	belief,	which	is	intimately	linked	to	priors.	The	brain	must	continually	update	the	hypotheses	that	it	entertains	about	the	world	in	light	of	the	information	reaching	it	and	against	its	current	beliefs.	Our	approach	leads	us	to	enquire	into	different	categories	of	Bayesian-Laplacian	priors,	the	beliefs	that	they	are	based	on	and	that	they	give	rise	to,	and	the	role	that	these	priors	and	the	beliefs	attached	to	them	play	in	shaping	the	brain’s	inferential	systems.	Our	discussion	is	not	exhaustive;	rather,	we	hope	that	it	lays	down	a	basic	framework	for	an	alternative	approach	through	which	to	consider	the	operations	of	the	brain	in	a	Bayesian-Laplacian	context.	The	major	departure	in	our	approach	is	a	distinction	between	two	kinds	of	priors,	Biological	(β	priors)	and	Artefactual	(α	
priors).	The	former	are	regulated	largely	by	inherited	brain	concepts	while	the	latter	are	subject	to	acquired	(synthetic)	brain	concepts	(Zeki,	2009).	This	distinction	leads	us	to	propose	further	that	the	beliefs	attached	to	the	two	categories	of	priors	must	also	be	distinguished	according	to	category.			As	a	preamble,	it	is	useful	to	outline	what	we	believe	are	some	important	principles	governing	the	organization	of	the	brain:		1. One	of	the	primordial	functions	of	the	brain	is	the	acquisition	of	knowledge.		2. This	knowledge	is	acquired	to	take	action,	but	the	knowledge	comes	first.		3.		The	brain	cannot	know	in	advance	what	conditions	or	stimuli	it	will	experience	or	has	to	acquire	knowledge	of.		It	is	therefore	organized	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	it	to	sample	epistemically	as	many	experiences	as	possible;	it																																																																																																																																																															apperceptions	that	are	not	based	on	experience,	especially	with	respect	to	space-raltions.	In	the	same	article,	he	also	stated	that	“the	judgment	of	the	sense	may	be	modified	by	experience	and	by	training	derived	under	various	circumstances,	and	may	be	adapted	to	the	new	conditions.”	He	thus	came	close	to	distinguishing	between	the	two	sets	of	priors	that	we	discuss	here,	although	his	discussion	remains	vague	and	does	not	give	or	define	either	a	general	or	specific	framework	for	distinguishing	between	priors	(a	term	he	did	not	use)	or	provide	a	specific	framework	of	how	the	“unconscious	inference”	operates	in,	for	example,	colour	vision,	as	we	do	here.				
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proof	of	the	equations	see	supplementary	material.		The	unvarying	property	of	surfaces	in	terms	of	colour	vision	is	their	reflectance,	namely	the	amount	of	light	of	any	given	waveband	–	in	percentage	terms	–	that	a	surface	reflects	in	relation	to	the	light	incident	on	it.	For	a	given	surface,	this	percentage	never	changes.	Hence,	one	finds	that	the	ratio	of	light	of	any	waveband	reflected	from	a	given	surface	and	from	its	surrounds	also	never	changes,	regardless	of	the	variation	in	the	amount	of	light	reflected	from	an	object.	If	the	intensity	of	light	of	any	given	waveband	reflected	from	a	surface	is	increased,	the	intensity	of	light	of	the	same	waveband	coming	from	the	surrounds	also	increases,	and	the	ratio	thus	remains	the	same.	By	extension,	the	ratios	of	light	of	all	wavebands	reflected	from	a	surface	and	from	its	surrounds	also	never	change.			Take	as	an	example	a	green	surface	which	forms	part	of	multicoloured	(natural)	scene	as	in	Land’s	colour	Mondrians,	and	thus	surrounded	with	many	patches	of	other	colours,	with	no	patch	being	surrounded	by	another	patch	of	a	single	colour	(Figure	1	shows	a	much	simplified	version).	Let	us	suppose	that	the	green	patch	(g)	reflects	x	per	cent	of	the	long-wave	(red)	light,	l,		incident	on	it,	y	percent	of	the	middle	wave	(green)	light,	m,		(green)		and	z	percent	of	the	short-wave	(blue)	light,	s,		incident	on	it.	The	surrounds,	having	a	higher	efficiency	for	reflecting	long-wave	light,	will	always	reflect	more	and	there	will	be	a	constant	ratio	in	the	amount	of	red	light	reflected	from	the	green	surface	and	from	its	surrounds.	Let	us	call	this	ratio	𝑔!The	surrounds	will	have	a	lower	efficiency	for	reflecting	green	light	and	hence	there	will	be	another	ratio	for	the	amount	of	green	light	(𝑔!)	reflected	from	it	and	from	the	surrounds,	and	a	third	ratio	for	the	amount	of	blue	light	𝑔! 4.	When	the	same	natural	scene	is	viewed	in	light	of	a	different	wavelength	composition,	the	amount	of	light	of	different	wavelengths	reflected	from	a	surface	and	from	its	surrounds	will	change,	often	significantly	(as,	for	example,	when	a	scene	is	viewed	successively	in	tungsten	light,	in	fluorescent	light	or	in	sunlight)	but	the	ratios	in	the	amount	of	light	of	different	wavebands	reflected	from	the	centre	and	from	the	surrounds	remain	the	same.	Formally,	let	us	consider	the	green	patch	viewed	under	two	different	illuminants,	where	the	first	one	has	𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	amounts	of	long,	middle,	and	short	wave	light	reflected	from	the	green	patch,	and	the	second	one	has	𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and																																																									4	For	brevity,	we	restrict	ourselves	to	long,	middle	and	short-wave	light,	without	giving	the	peak	values	along	the	spectrum;	in	practice,	and	under	natural	viewing	conditions,	a	surface	will	reflect	light	of	many	wavelengths,	but	there	will	be	a	(constant)	ratio	for	light	of	any	wavelength	reflected	from	the	centre	and	surrounds.		
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𝑔!!  reflected from it.	The	first	illuminant	results		in		(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	)	and	the	second	in	(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	)	ratios	of	long-,	middle-,	and	short-	wave	light	reflected	from	the	green	patch		and	from	its	surrounds,	respectively.	Then,	mathematically,	we	have:		 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"#$ ≔  !!!!!!  ≡ 𝑥 ≡  !!!!!!	;		𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"#$%! ≔  !!!!!!  ≡ 𝑦 ≡  !!!!!!	;		𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!!!"# ≔  𝑔!!𝑔!!  ≡ 𝑧 ≡  𝑔!!𝑔!! 		where	the	ratios	𝑥,𝑦,	and	𝑧	remain	the	same,	regardless	of	the	precise	wavelength-energy	composition	of	the	light	reflected	from	the	green	patch	and	from	its	surrounds.		It	is	through	such	a	that	the	brain	builds	constant	colour	categories.	These	constant	colours	constitute	the	𝛽	priors;	namely,	the	prior	beliefs	that	sensations	are	caused	by	coloured	objects	in	the	particular	(ratio	preserving)	fashion	described	above.	This	belief	is	a	classic	example	of	Kant’s	statement	in	his	
Prologemena	(Kant,	1783)	that	“The	Mind	[brain]	does	not	derive	its	laws	(a	
priori)	from	nature	but	prescribes	them	to	her”.		The	brain	likely	uses	such	a	ratio	taking-system,	based	on	the	above	constants,	to	construct	constant	colour	categories,	which	constitute	both	the	experience	and	posterior	beliefs	(the	two	are	here	interchangeable,	see	above).	There	is	no	physical	law	that	dictates	that	such	ratios	should	be	taken;	it	is	instead	an	inherited	brain	law	and,	given	the	widespread	use	of	colour	constancy	in	the	animal	kingdom,	we	make	the	assumption	that	similar	mechanisms,	or	very	nearly	so,	are	used	in	species	as	far	apart	as	the	goldfish	(Ingle,	1985)	and	the	human	(Land,	1974).			No	amount	of	visual	experience	can	modify	the	colour	categories	(β	priors);	in	fact	they	cannot	even	be	modified	by	higher	cognitive	knowledge.	For	example,	green	leaves	reflect	more	green	than	red	light	at	noon	and	more	red	light	than	green	at	dawn	and	at	dusk;	but	they	are	always	perceived	as	green,	even	in	the	face	of	knowledge	that	they	are	reflecting	more	red	light	under	certain	conditions.	Hence	the	β	priors	in	colour	are	extremely	stable	and	un-modifiable	with	experience.	Technically,	they	are	endowed	with	precision.	Priors	exert	a	more	constrained	effect	over	posteriors	when	they	are	more	precise,	as	in	biological	priors.	We	use	precision	here	in	a	technical	fashion	to	denote	the	confidence	afforded	to	priors;	precision	is	the	inverse	dispersion	or	uncertainty	encoded	by	a	probability	distribution	(e.g.,	the	variance	of	a	Gaussian	distribution).	We	define	precision	as	1/variance.	In	normal	colour	vision,	given	the	B	prior,	the	variance	is	very	close	to	0	and	the	precision	therefore	approaches	an	infinite	value.								
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see	below)	and,	even	if	produced,	is	unlikely	to	be	durable.	The	same	is	true	of	the	expression	on	a	face,	with	certain	expressions	being	immediately	recognizable	as	comforting	or	loving	and	others	leading	to	different	emotional	apprehensions.	The	posterior	that	results	from	this	β prior	through	experience	is	thus	similarly	circumscribed,	since	any	departure	(as	produced	by	inversions,	for	example)	would	mean	that	the	brain	will	either	not	classify	it	as	a	normal	face,	or	that	it	will	only	be	temporarily	classified	as	a	face,	or	that	it	will	be	classified	as	an	abnormal	face,	without	leaving	a	permanent	posterior.			Any	posterior	generated	from	a	face	β prior	must	therefore	be	strictly	linked	to	what	is	a	normal	significant	configuration	which	constitutes	a	face.	A	child,	for	example,	begins	to	learn	to	associate	certain	expressions	on	a	normal	face	with	certain	social	interactions	–	whether,	for	example,	someone	is	enjoying	one’s	company	or	is	bored	by	it,	whether	small	inflexions	represent	doubts	or	threats,	and	so	on.	But	it	is	unlikely	to	associate	the	expressions	on	an	inverted	face	with	a	permanent	posterior,	since	an	inverted	face	disobeys	the	inherited	brain	concept	of	the	significant	configuration	that	constitutes	a	face.	This	does	not	mean	that	posteriors	related	to	faces	cannot	be	of	an	unusual	nature	–	for	example	a	continual	smile	linked	to	wicked	behaviour	on	the	part	of	an	individual	may	lead	the	perceiver	to	establish	a	different	posterior	from	the	same	β priors	for	that	individual.	But	here	again,	a	perceiver	is	unlikely	to	form	a	permanent	posterior	of	a	smile	linked	to	wickedness	if	the	face	is	mis-aligned	or	inverted.		It	is	interesting	to	note	that,	in	his	effort	to	give	what	he	called	“a	visual	shock”,	the	English	painter	Francis	Bacon	subverted	the	brain’s	β priors	in	terms	of	faces,	and	took	to	painting	highly	deformed	faces,	which	depart	significantly	from	the	significant	configurations	that	constitute	the	normal	β priors	for	faces	(Zeki	&	Ishizu,	2013);	however	prolonged	the	viewing,	these	never	become	accepted	as	normal	faces.	Indeed,	the	viewing	of	stimuli	in	which	inherited	concepts	of	face	(and	space)	are	deformed	and	violated	leads	to	significant	activation	in	frontoparietal	cortex,	whereas	the	viewing	of	“deformed”	or	unusual	configurations	of	common	objects	such	as	cars	do	not.	Even	daily	exposure	to	deformed	faces	and	deformed	objects	for	1	month	does	not	lead	to	a	significant		change	in	activation	patterns	for	both	categories,	suggesting	that	such	biological	concepts	are	stable	at	the	neural	level,	at	least	within	a	time	frame	of	1	month	(Chen	&	Zeki,	2011).	This	neurobiological	demonstration	is	consistent	with	our	proposed	subdivisions	of	priors	into	the	biological	and	artefactual	categories.				
IV	A.	The	‘belief’	attached	to	faces:		We	now	outline	in	general	terms	the	biologically	based	initial	belief	attached	to	normal	faces.	It	is	constrained	by	the	fact	that	a	face	must	contain	a	certain	number	of	features	such	as	eyes,	nose,	mouth	etc,	set	out	within	certain	proportions	and	symmetrical	relations	to	each	other	which,	together,	constitute	a	significant	configuration	typical	of	a	face.	An	absence	of	any	of	these	features	or	any	significant	violation	of	these	proportions	or	relations	will	automatically	depart	from	such	a	belief,	and	lead	to	its	classification	as	abnormal.	There	are	of	course	many	ways	in	which	faces	can	be	represented;	they	can,	for	example,	be	
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represented	in	terms	of	straight	lines	in	a	drawing.	But	such,	though	recognized	as	representing	a	face,	will	be	immediately	classified	as	a	drawing	and	therefore	not	a	biological	face.	This	shows	how	constrained	such	a	belief	and	the	β prior	attached	to	it	is.	In	terms	of	generality,	one	person’s	belief	that	the	object	s/he	is	seeing	is	a	face	and	that	all	others	will	also	perceive	a	face	in	that	configuration	is	a	sound	one	and	makes	that	belief	general.	Just	like	colour,	it	therefore	has	universal	validity.		
V	.	Artefactual	(a)	priors	By	artefactual	priors,	we	refer	to	the	many	constructs	–	from	houses	and	cars	to	ordinary	utensils	and	tools	–	for	which	there	is	no	inherited	brain	concept.	Instead,	the	brain	acquires	a	concept	of	these	objects	through	experience	and	consequent	updating	of	empirical	priors;	these	are	continually	modified	throughout	life.	These	empirical	priors	are	also	strongly	culture	dependent.	In	medieval	times,	people	had	no	concept	of	a	car	or	a	plane.	Since	their	introduction,	there	have	been	many	modifications	of	these	constructs,	and	the	concepts	attached	to	them	have	changed	accordingly.	The	concept	of	a	plane	that	someone	living	in	the	1930s	had,	for	example,	did	not	include	jumbo	jets	equipped	with	jet	engines;	these	have	been	added	to	the	overall	concept	of	a	plane	since.	There	are,	of	course	many	other	examples	one	could	give,	including	the	use	of	knives	and	forks	and	chop-sticks,	which	differ	between	cultures	and	times.	The	formation	of	such	concepts	is	strongly	dependent	on	experience	and	culture,	which	distinguishes	them	from	biologically	inherited	concepts	(see	Figure	2).		Crucially,	acquired	or	empirical	priors	emerge	de	novo	and	are	driven	by	experiences	that	are	unique	to	any	individual	in	any	given	lifetime,	although	there	may	be,	and	usually	are,	population	level	similarities.	They	therefore	are	necessarily	less	precise	and	more	accommodating	than	biological	priors.	This	follows	because	they	are	designed	to	be	modified	by	experience.			It	is	now	generally	accepted	that	there	is	a	complex	of	areas,	known	as	the	lateral	occipital	complex	(LOC)	which	is	critical	for	object	recognition	(Grill-Spector,	2003).	Even	though	it	has	been	argued	that	the	so-called	face	areas	may	not	be	as	specific	to	faces	as	originally	supposed	(see	above),	and	that	cells	in	them	may	encode	objects	as	well,	including	ones	which	we	would	classify	under	artefactual	categories,	the	differential	response	to	faces	and	objects	when	inverted	suggests	that	they	are	processed	differently.	Moreover,	neural	sensitivity	to	faces	increases	with	age	in	face-selective	but	not	object-selective	areas	of	the	brain,	and	the	perceptual	discriminability	of	faces	correlates	with	neural	sensitivity	to	face	identity	in	face	selective	regions,	whereas	it	does	not	correlate	with	a	heightened	amplitude	in	either	face	or	object	selective	areas	(Natu	et	al.,	2016).		There	is	no	definitive	evidence	about	when	infants	begin	to	recognize	objects	or	whether	they	recognize	faces	before	recognizing	objects.	Indeed,	it	has	been	shown	that	infants	can	recognize	differences	between	shapes	even	at	1	month	where	the	outside	contour/shape	is	static	and	identical,	but	where	the	inside	smaller	shapes	are	different	to	each	other	in	each	image	if,	significantly,	one	of	the	smaller	inner	shapes	is	jiggled	or	moved	(Bushnell	et	al.,	1989);	this	may,	in	
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Step	I	(Biological	𝛽	prior):	inherited	or	rapidly	acquired	very	shortly	after	birth,	a	𝛽	prior	is	neurobiologically	immutable;	it	is	constant	throughout	one’s	life	span,	and	is	almost	totally	resistant	to	culture	and	learning.	Notationally,	we	can	say	that	the	posterior	for	colour,	ℭ,	is	deterministic	of	the	𝛽	prior	for	the	colour	category,	𝛽! ,	or		 𝕮	← 𝜷𝑪																									(	1	)		Step	2	(Initialization):	Immediately	after	birth,	the	𝛽	prior	is	incorporated	with	the	first	scene	(𝜺𝟎)	viewed	along	with	a	prior	(derived	from	viewing	a	new	scene	containing	a	hue);	next,	the	illuminants	are	adjusted	so	that	the	green	patch	is	reflecting	more	red	light	and	the	shade	of	green	changes	to	a	darker	green	which	becomes	the	initial	posterior	ℌ!.	Notationally,	we	say	the	initial	posterior	for	hue,	𝕳𝟎,	is	dependent	upon	𝛽	prior	𝛽! 	for	hue	and	the	first	experiment	conducted	𝜺𝟎,	or		 						𝕳𝟎 ∝  𝜺𝟎 𝜷𝟎𝑯             (	2	)		Step	3	(Adaptive	Learning):	The	illuminants	are	re-adjusted	(the	same	scene	is	viewed	in	a	different	illuminant)	so	that	the	green	patch	is	now	reflecting	more	green	light.	Now	its	hue	changes	to	a	much	brighter	green.	The	posterior	formed	in	Step	2	then	becomes	a	new	(now	more	informative)	𝛽 prior	of	hue	(call	it	𝛽!!)	and	along	with	a	new	scene	(𝜺𝟏),	forms	a	new	posterior	of	hue	𝕳𝟏.	This	process	continues	throughout	the	entire	life	span:	whenever	new	experiments	occur,	old	posteriors	become	the	new	priors,	and	together	they	form	the	new	posteriors,	Notationally,	for	the	𝑛!!	iteration:							
									𝕳𝒏  ∝  𝜺𝒏 𝜷𝒏𝑯																				(	2	)		The	procedure	is	illustrated	in	Figure	3	below	
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R	as	the	ratio	in	the	amount	of	light	of	different	wavebands	reflected	from	the	centre	and	from	the	surrounds	(hereinafter	ratio).		Given	0,	S,	the	ratio	R	that	forms	colour	category	is	fixed:		 𝑹 ≡ 𝑶/𝑺  5.		By	Bayes’	rule,	we	have		 [C|E,	R]	∝ 𝑬 𝑪,𝑹 𝑪 𝑹 𝑹 ∝ 𝑹 	
	where	the	second	∝	follows	from:	since	C	is	deterministic	of	R,	then	ℙ(C|R)	is	either	1	or	0,	and	that	C	and	R	are	independent	of	E.	Denoting	[C|E,	R]	as	the	posterior	ℭ	for	colour	category	and	 𝑅 	as	the	𝛽 prior	𝛽! 	for	colour	category,	we	have	proven	equation	(1).		Next,			 𝑯 𝑪,𝑬,𝑹  ∝  [𝑬|𝑯,𝑪,𝑹] 𝑯 𝑪,𝑹 𝑹 𝑪 𝑪 ∝ [𝑬|𝑯][𝑯|𝑪,𝑹][𝑹]											where	the second ∝ 	follows	from:	C	and	R	are	independent	of	E,	P(C|R)	is	either	1	or	0,	and	C	is	deterministic	of	R.	Denoting	[H|C,	E,	R]	as	the	posterior	ℌ	for	hue,	[𝑯|𝑪,𝑹][𝑹]	as	the	𝛽 prior 𝛽!  for	hue,	and	[𝐸|𝐻]	as	𝜀 the	experiment	conducted,	we	have	ℌ ∝ 𝜀 𝛽! ,	which	proves	equation	(2).		Remarks:		Note	that	the	𝛽	prior	𝛽! 	for	hue	constitutes	two	parts	 𝑯 𝑪,𝑹 	an	informative	prior	for	hue,	and	 𝑹 ,	the	𝛽 prior	𝛽! 	for	colour	category.									 																																																												5	Here,	O	and	S	are	both	three-dimensional.	For	example,	0	=	(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	)		and	S	=	(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	).	See	Section	III	B	of	the	article	for	further	details.	
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